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1 |  INTRODUCTION
In the past decade research on the influence of stress on 
risky decision making has surged. Overall, the results sug-
gest a small but reliable effect, indicating that stress increases 
risk-taking behavior (Starcke & Brand, 2016). However, the 
pattern of results is highly heterogeneous. While some studies 
investigating the effect of stress on financial risk taking have 
reported increases (e.g., Buckert, Schwieren, Kudielka, & 
Fiebach, 2014; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008), 
others have reported decreases in risky decision making (e.g., 
Cahlíková & Cingl, 2017; Pabst, Brand, & Wolf, 2013a) or 
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Abstract
Many decisions under risk and uncertainty are made under physical or emotional 
stress. A recent meta-analysis suggested that stress reliably influences risk taking 
but did not find a relation between single measures of stress such as cortisol and risk 
taking. One reason for the conflicting findings could be that the influence of stress 
on risk taking depends not only on physiological but also on psychological stress 
responses, in particular affective valence. We tested this hypothesis in an exploratory 
empirical study: Seventy participants worked on a financial risk-taking task. In half 
of the participants acute stress was induced with a cold pressor task. For all partici-
pants we measured cortisol and α-amylase levels, blood pressure, subjective arousal, 
and affective valence before and after the task. The stress induction increased par-
ticipants' levels of cortisol, subjective arousal, and systolic blood pressure but did not 
directly influence negative affect or risky decision making. Examining the interplay 
between physiological and psychological stress responses, a moderation analysis re-
vealed an interaction between stress induction and affect valence: Negative affect 
predicted an increase in risk-seeking decision making in the stress condition, but not 
in the control group. A similar moderation was found with cortisol reactivity, that is, 
negative affect predicted an increase in risk-seeking decision making in participants 
with high cortisol reactivity but not in participants with low cortisol reactivity. These 
results suggest that the effect of stress on risky decision making depends on the inter-
play of affective valence and cortisol reactivity.
K E Y W O R D S
acute stress induction, affect, cortisol, decision making, risky choice
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no effect (e.g., Sokol-Hessner, Raio, Gottesman, Lackovic, & 
Phelps, 2016; von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, 
& Heinrichs, 2012). In the current research we investigate 
whether the contradictory findings can be reconciled by con-
sidering the heterogeneous nature of stress responses. Stress 
responses involve a range of physiological and psychological 
reactions that can occur together but can also show different 
paths of activations (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Often re-
search has focused on a single response, but whether stress 
impacts risky decision making may depend on the interplay 
of physiological and psychological responses elicited.
1.1 | Physiological and psychological 
responses to acute stress
Stress can be defined as an individual's response to a stressor, 
that is, an environmental condition or task that challenges or 
even exceeds the resources of the individual. Stressors can be 
of a physical nature, such as heat, cold, or pain, or psycho-
logical, such as the threat of exclusion or failure (Lazarus, 
2006). Typical stressors employed in decision research in-
clude the cold pressor task (CPT; Lovallo, 1975), a physi-
cal stressor where participants immerse their hand and arm 
in ice water for up to 3  min, and the Trier Social Stress 
Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993), in 
which participants have to endure a demanding evaluative 
social situation. More recently, a combination of a physi-
cal and a social stressor, the social evaluative cold pressure 
task (SECPT) was developed. In the SECPT participants are 
filmed while they immerse their hand in ice water (Schwabe, 
Haddad, & Schächinger, 2008). Stress responses include a 
variety of physiological and psychological reactions. On the 
physiological level, acute stress involves activation of the 
autonomous nervous system, causing a fast sympathetic re-
sponse resulting an increase in heart rate, blood pressure, and 
electrodermal activity as well as the activation of the hypo-
thalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis, leading to a slower 
release of cortisol (for an overview see Starcke & Brand, 
2016). On the psychological level, stress is usually connected 
to affective responses, which can range from more arousal-
related feelings such as tension or nervousness to feelings 
that involve fear, anxiety, frustration, sadness, and anger and 
even positive emotional states (Lazarus, 2006).
Although physiological and psychological stress re-
sponses such as cortisol or cardiovascular reactivity and 
negative affect often go hand in hand, they can also appear 
independently (e.g., Campbell & Ehlert, 2012; Dickerson & 
Kemeny, 2004). For instance, people may differentially inter-
pret the arousal induced by a stressor depending on how they 
appraise the situation—with some perceiving a stressor as an 
exciting challenge while others perceive it as a threat (Lee 
& Andrade, 2015). Furthermore, the temporal trajectories of 
subjective and physiological responses differ. Negative sub-
jective feelings and symptoms of sympathetic activation tend 
to be most intense in the presence of the stressor but decrease 
once the stressor has passed (McRae et al., 2006). In contrast, 
for instance, cortisol levels may reach their peak only after 
a (short-lived) stressor has passed and can take hours to fall 
back to baseline levels (McRae et al., 2006). Accordingly, de-
pending on the nature of the stressor and its appraisal by the 
person, the timing, and previously existing moods or emo-
tions, the pattern of physiological and psychological stress 
responses may differ.
1.2 | Stress responses and risky 
decision making
As reviewed above, the literature on the influence of acute 
stress on risky decision making is rather heterogeneous, with 
studies finding increased risk seeking, increased risk aver-
sion, and no effect. A recent meta-analysis found that overall, 
acute stress leads to more risky decisions (Starcke & Brand, 
2016). However, the authors found no relation between sin-
gle measures of physiological stress responses (cortisol and 
α-amylase) and risky decision making.
Similar to the literature on stress, research on the relation 
of affective responses and risky decision making has resulted 
in inconsistent results (for a review see Cohen, Pham, & 
Andrade, 2007). Although the majority of research has sug-
gested that negative emotions such as sadness or fear (but not 
anger) decrease risky decision making (e.g., Chou, Lee, & 
Ho, 2007; Kamstra, Kramer, & Levi, 2003; Stanton, Reeck, 
Huetel, & Labar, 2014; Yuen & Lee, 2003), several studies 
have reported the opposite pattern (e.g., Kliger & Levy, 2003; 
Mittal & Ross, 1998; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001).
Here, we suggest that some of the inconsistencies in the 
effect of stress (and also negative affect) on risky decision 
making may be caused by focusing on a single stress response 
(e.g., cortisol or affect) and neglecting the potential inter-
play between physiological and psychological responses to 
acute stressors. Two strands of research motivate this idea: 
First, Starcke and Brand (2016) found a difference between 
systemic stressors, physiological stressors such as pain, and 
processive stressors, stressors that involve an interpretation 
of the environment (Dedovic, Duchesne, Andrews, Engert, 
& Pruessner, 2009), in their meta-analysis. The most com-
monly used systemic stressor was the CPT, whereas the most 
frequently used processive stressor was the TSST. The CPT 
and TSST, however, also differ in the degree to which they 
elicit negative affective responses. In contrast to the TSST, 
the CPT frequently does not elicit a lasting negative affec-
tive response (McRae et al., 2006). The SECPT is rated 
as similarly unpleasant as the CPT (Nowacki et al., 2019; 
Schwabe et al., 2008) and leads to decreases in positive mood 
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and calmness immediately after the stress induction (e.g., 
Schwabe, Höffken, Tegenthoff, & Wolf, 2013), but does not 
seem to lead to a longer lasting mood disturbance (Giles, 
Mahoney, Brunye, Taylor, & Kanarek, 2014). Accordingly, 
differences in the impact of these stressors on risky decision 
making may also depend on the level of negative affect par-
ticipants experienced. Second, research on the impact of neg-
ative affective states on risky decision making has suggested 
that increased risk taking is more likely when participants not 
only feel negative affect but also report high levels of arousal 
(Leith & Baumeister, 1996), because under these condition 
people (a) are motivated to seek rewards to repair their af-
fective state and (b) have reduced capacity for self-regula-
tion (e.g., Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007; Tice et al., 2001). 
Here, we investigated how psychological and physiological 
responses interact in their influence on risky decision making 
in an exploratory empirical study.
2 |  METHOD
In the study we investigated financial risky decision mak-
ing under stress and no stress while measuring physiological 
(cortisol and α-amylase levels, blood pressure) and subjec-
tive affective responses (self-reported valence and arousal). 
We induced stress with a CPT that contained a social evalu-
ative element. Risk taking was measured with a behavioral 
decision task that consisted of 40 decisions between two 
gambles that contained positive and negative outcomes. The 
study was approved by the ethical committee of the cantons 
Basel and Basel-land (EKBB; Ref No. 181/11).
2.1 | Design
We implemented a mixed experimental design in which we 
examined the influence of stress on risk taking within and be-
tween participants. In a treatment group (stress condition) we 
observed risk taking before and after a stress induction. In ad-
dition, we compared risk taking of the treatment group with 
risk taking in a control group (no stress condition) in which 
the stress induction was replaced with a neutral manipulation. 
Cortisol, α-amylase, and subjective affect were measured at 
four time points: before the first risk-taking task (T1), after 
the first risk-taking task (T2), after the stress induction but 
before the second risk-taking task (T3), and after the second 
risk-taking task (T4). Blood pressure was measured at five 
time points: baseline, 30 s, 3 min, 8 min, and 20 min after 
the start of the stressor. Figure 1 presents a schematic over-
view of the experimental procedure. The data can be found 
on OSF. https://osf.io/dmzku.
2.2 | Participants
Seventy participants (40 in the stress condition and 30 in the 
no-stress condition, Mage  =  24.4  years, SDage  =  5.3) were 
recruited at the University of Basel. Participants could only 
take part in the study if they did not take medication includ-
ing corticoids (except oral contraceptives), did not habitually 
smoke, and had no psychological or physiological diagnoses. 
In about one fourth to one third of participants even reliable 
acute stressors such as the TSST do not result in an increase 
in cortisol (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). Thus, we collected 
more participants in the stress condition, to ensure that the 
stress manipulation would lead to an increase in cortisol for 
a sufficient sample of participants. Forty-eight participants 
identified as females and 22 as males. Fourteen males (35%) 
were in the stress condition and 8 (27%) in the control con-
dition, χ2(1) = 0.55, p = .604. Mean age of participants in 
the control condition was 26 and 23 years in the stress con-
dition, t(42.63) = 1.83, p = .075. Participants received 20 
Swiss francs (CHF) per hour as compensation for participat-
ing in the study (approx. USD 22). Additionally, one of the 
decisions was randomly chosen and the preferred gamble 
was played. Participants received/paid 10% of the gamble's 
F I G U R E  1  Overview of the 
experimental design and the experimental 
time line. T1–T4 indicate the measurement 
time points for cortisol and subjective affect 
(T2 was on average 17 min, T3 on average 
40 min, and T4 on average 51 min after T1). 
N = sample size. CPT, cold pressor task; 
SAM, self-assessment manikin; STAI, state-
trait anxiety inventory; STAXI, state-trait 
anger expression inventory; VAS, visual 
analogue scale
4 of 15 |   von HELvERSEn and RIESKaMP
outcome. Overall, testing took 1  hr, 30  min. Testing took 
place in the afternoon between 12 noon and 3 p.m. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. Technical prob-
lems and an experimenter error resulted in a total of eight 
missing data points (one data point each on the following var-
iables: baseline diastolic blood pressure (DBP), diastolic and 
systolic blood pressure (SBP) at 3 min and 8 min, α-amylase 
at measurement time points 3 and 4, time passed between 
measurement time point 3 and 4). We used multiple imputa-
tion to obtain 10 estimates for each of these values based on a 
predictive mean matching algorithm with 50 iterations as im-
plemented in IBM SPSS Statistics version 23 using all physi-
ological measurements as well as gender, condition, and the 
measurement time points as predictors. We then imputed the 
mean of the predicted values. In addition, we also conducted 
analyses excluding participants with missing values pairwise 
from the analyses. The findings only deviate slightly from 
the results with imputed missing values and all conclusions 
hold. A full report of these analyses can be found in the sup-
plemental online materials on OSF.
An outlier analysis indicated that three participants (one 
in the control and two in the stress condition) had extremely 
high (>3 SD) cortisol values and one participant had (in the 
control condition) extremely high α-amylase values during 
the first or second measurements. Accordingly, we excluded 
these participants pairwise, that is just from the analyses, in 
which measures of cortisol or α-amylase were included.1
2.3 | Financial decision-making task
The financial decision-making task consisted of 40 decisions 
between two gambles. Each trial consisted of a choice be-
tween a reference gamble (Gamble A), in which participants 
could win CHF 15 or lose CHF 5 with a probability of .5 
(expected value of CHF 5), and a target gamble (Gamble B). 
The reference gamble was the same in every trial, but there 
were 40 different target gambles structured in two sets: (a) 
high-outcome gambles (e.g., win/lose CHF 60 with a prob-
ability of .5) and (b) low-outcome gambles (e.g., win/lose 
CHF 30 with a probability of .5). For each gamble type (high 
or low outcome) we created sets of gambles by varying the 
target gamble's expected value from −5 to 15/30 in steps of 
CHF 5. The expected value was varied by changing either 
(a) the amount that could be won, (b) the amount that could 
be lost, or (c) the probability with which each outcome could 
occur (see Table 1 for an overview). The financial decision-
making task essentially follows the logic of multiple-price 
lists that have been widely used in economics (e.g., Pedroni 
et al., 2017).
The order in which the target gambles were presented was 
randomly determined for each participant. Reference and tar-
get gambles were presented sequentially. Each trial started 
with a fixation cross (100 ms). Then the reference gamble was 
presented until participants pressed the return key. The target 
gamble appeared until participants made a choice by pressing 
“1” for the reference gamble or “2” for the target gamble. 
The task was implemented in Presentation (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA). A screenshot of the presenta-
tion of a target gamble can be found in the online Supporting 
Information on OSF. https://osf.io/dmzku
2.4 | Stress manipulation and measurements
In the stress condition, we used a variation of the CPT 
(Hines & Brown, 1936; Lovallo, 1975). The CPT is a fre-
quently used method to induce a stress response. In the CPT 
participants immerse their right hand in ice water (0–4°C, 
M = 1.86°C, SD = 0.67) for as long as possible up to 3 min. 
It is a commonly used systemic stressor that usually does not 
influence participants' affective valence. Because it has been 
shown that physiological stress responses are increased when 
a social evaluative element is added to the CPT, we used an 
adaptation of the SECPT (Schwabe et al., 2008). In our task 
the experimenter watched the participants during the task, but 
we did not film participants or tell them that their facial ex-
pressions would be analyzed. We chose this version for sim-
plicity and as we expected it to reliably induce stress while 
keeping effects on affective valence to a minimum.
Five participants had to remove their hand earlier be-
cause it was too painful. During the CPT the experimenter 
was situated in the same room as the participant, sitting 
slightly behind the participant, monitoring the CPT and 
blood pressure.2 A female and a male experimenter, who 
 1Including the participants with outliers in the respective analyses leads to 
the same conclusions for all analyses with cortisol and only small changes 
in the estimated parameter values. For instance, in the analyses with 
cortisol reactivity as a moderator variable the interaction between affective 
valence and cortisol reactivity is also significant, ΔR2 = .08, F(1,66) = 
6.60, p = .013 and we find an effect of affect when cortisol reactivity was 
high (+ SD), b = −1.32, SE = 0.65, p = .045. For α-amylase, including the 
outlier, we find a significant interaction between α-amylase and affective 
valence, ΔR2 = .08, F(1,66) = 4.24, p = .044, but the effect of affective 
valence on change in risk taking when α-amylase was high (+ SD) remains 
non-significant, p = .088.
 2The stress induction in these five participants was successful as can be 
seen in a strong cortisol response (i.e., cortisol levels at T3 were 
M = 29.92, SD = 8.68) and thus we included them in the analyses. To 
investigate whether these participants unduly influenced the results we also 
conducted analyses excluding them. These analyses showed the same 
pattern of results as reported for the complete sample: The stress group had 
significantly higher values than the control group for cortisol and anxiety at 
T3 and SBP and DBP 3 min after the start of the CPT. Furthermore, also 
the moderation analysis of affective valence and stress showed the same 
pattern of results with a significant interaction (p = .008) and an effect of 
affective valence on risk taking in the stress condition, b = −1.29, SE = 
0.62, p = .041.
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were randomly assigned to participants, conducted the 
CPT. Participants' stress responses did not differ between 
the two experimenters (for similar findings, see Schwabe & 
Schächinger, 2018). The control condition followed the 
same procedure with the only differences that participants 
immersed their hand in warm water (37–40°C, M = 38.98°C, 
Gamble no. p (Gain) Gain p (Loss) Loss EV Set
1 .50 60 .50 −70 −5 High
2 .50 60 .50 −60 0 High
3 .50 60 .50 −50 5 High
4 .50 60 .50 −40 10 High
5 .50 60 .50 −30 15 High
6 .50 60 .50 −20 20 High
7 .50 60 .50 −10 25 High
8 .50 30 .50 −40 −5 Low
9 .50 30 .50 −30 0 Low
10 .50 30 .50 −20 5 Low
11 .50 30 .50 −10 10 Low
12 .50 30 .50 −0.1 15 Low
13 .50 50 .50 −60 −5 High
14 .50 60 .50 −60 0 High
15 .50 70 .50 −60 5 High
16 .50 80 .50 −60 10 High
17 .50 90 .50 −60 15 High
18 .50 100 .50 −60 20 High
19 .50 110 .50 −60 25 High
20 .50 120 .50 −60 30 High
21 .50 20 .50 −30 −5 Low
22 .50 30 .50 −30 0 Low
23 .50 40 .50 −30 5 Low
24 .50 50 .50 −30 10 Low
25 .50 60 .50 −30 15 Low
26 .50 70 .50 −30 20 Low
27 .50 80 .50 −30 25 Low
28 .50 90 .50 −30 30 Low
29 .46 60 .54 −60 −5 High
30 .54 60 .46 −60 5 High
31 .58 60 .42 −60 10 High
32 .63 60 .37 −60 15 High
33 .67 60 .33 −60 20 High
34 .71 60 .29 −60 25 High
35 .75 60 .25 −60 30 High
36 .42 30 .58 −30 −5 Low
37 .58 30 .42 −30 5 Low
38 .67 30 .33 −30 10 Low
39 .75 30 .25 −30 15 Low
40 .83 30 .17 −30 20 Low
Note: p (Gain) = probability of receiving the positive outcome (Gain); p (Loss) = probability of receiving the 
negative outcome (Loss).
Abbreviation: EV, gamble's expected value.
T A B L E  1  Overview of the target 
gambles
6 of 15 |   von HELvERSEn and RIESKaMP
SD  =  0.81). During the water task we measured systolic 
and  diastolic blood pressure at five measurement points: 
baseline, 30 s, 3 min, 8 min, and 20 min after the start of 
the task to record the cardiovascular response and to abort 
the experiment in case of dangerously high or low levels of 
blood pressure. Blood pressure was measured with a sphyg-
momanometer on the left upper arm.
As subjective stress responses we measured affective 
valence, arousal, and dominance (measuring how self-con-
fident and in control participants feel) with the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985) 
using a 9-point scale at T1 to T4 (see Figure 1). The SAM 
consists of five drawings, each depicting different states of 
affective valence (1 = very happy to 9 = very sad), arousal 
(1 = high arousal to 9 = relaxed and calm), and dominance/
self-confidence (1 = unsure/not in control to 9 = dominant 
and in control). Participants were asked to select the picture 
that described their current affective state best or to indicate 
between which pictures their current affect lay. Additionally, 
we measured current anxiety and anger with the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, 
& Spielberger, 1981) and the State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory (STAXI; Schwenkmezger, Hodapp, & Spielberger, 
1992) at T1 and T3.
Last, we collected saliva samples with Salivettes (Sarstedt, 
Nuembrecht, Germany) to determine cortisol and α-amylase 
levels at T1 to T4. Saliva samples were analyzed at the labora-
tory of the Technical University Dresden, Germany. Salivary 
free cortisol levels were determined using a chemilumines-
cence immunoassay (IBL International GmbH, Hamburg, 
Germany) with intra- and interassay precision of 2.5% and 
4.7%, respectively.
2.5 | Procedure
After participants arrived we determined if they met the in-
clusion criteria for the study, obtained informed consent, and 
gave them approximately 8 oz of water to drink. Then, we 
took the first saliva sample and measured affective valence 
and arousal (T1, see Figure 1). After the measurements par-
ticipants immediately proceeded with the first session of the 
financial decision-making task. Thereafter, participants gave 
the second saliva sample and again completed the affective 
valence and arousal measures (T2). Next, participants pro-
ceeded with the stress manipulation. After the stress manipu-
lation participants indicated on a visual analog scale ranging 
from not unpleasant at all (0) to very unpleasant (20) how 
unpleasant the CPT had been. We took the third saliva sam-
ple 15 min after the stress manipulation and measured affec-
tive and arousal (T3). Immediately afterward participants 
performed the financial risk-taking task again (Session 2). 
After that we again measured affective valence and arousal 
and took the fourth saliva sample (T4). In addition, partici-
pants filled out a questionnaire measuring novelty seeking as 
a potential correlate of risk attitudes (Cloninger, Przybeck, 
Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994).3
3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Valence, arousal, and physiological 
stress responses
Analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics version 
23. First we analyzed if the stress manipulation influenced 
participants' subjective responses and physiological re-
sponses (for means and SDs see Tables 2 and 3) using analy-
ses of variance (ANOVAs) on valence, subjective arousal, 
dominance, SBP, DBP, α-amylase, and cortisol with meas-
urement time (T1–T4 for cortisol and subjective arousal 
and the five measurement points for systolic and DBP) as 
within-subject factors and stress condition as a between-
subjects factor. When necessary we adjusted the degrees of 
freedom according to the Greenhouse–Geisser correction. 
The analyses showed that subjective arousal, SBP, DBP, 
and cortisol levels increased in the stress group but not in 
the control group. In the control group, cortisol, SBP, and 
arousal decreased, suggesting that participants' initial tension 
decreased during participation. This was indicated by signifi-
cant interactions of measurement time and stress condition, 
arousal: F(2.49, 169.44) = 4.911, p = .003, partial η2 = 0.07; 
SBP: F(3.04, 206.78) = 18.71, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.22; 
DBP: F(3.52, 239.34) = 34.36, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.34; 
cortisol: F(1.39, 90.1) = 26.31, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.29; 
see Figure 2a. Additional t tests revealed that participants in 
the stress and control group did not differ in cortisol levels 
at the first two measurement points (all ps  >  .84) but that 
the stress group had higher cortisol levels at T3 and T4 (all 
ps <  .001). Similarly, subjective arousal did not differ sig-
nificantly between the two groups at the start of the study 
(T1, ps >  .12), but the stress group showed higher arousal 
after the stress manipulation at T3, t(68) = 2, p =  .05 (see 
Table 2 for means and SDs). For SBP, participants had some-
what higher values in the control group than the stress group 
at baseline, t(68) = 2.25, p = .028, but did not differ 30 s after 
immersing their hand in the water, t(68) = 0.88, p = .381. In 
regard to the measurements 3, 8, and 20  min after putting 
their hand into the water, participants in the stress group had 
clearly higher values than participants in the control group 
after 3 min, t(68) = −4.22, p < .001, somewhat higher val-
ues after 8 min, t(66.35) = −1.71, p = .09, and no difference 
 3Participants' eye movements were also recorded in this study. However, 
we do not report analyses on eye tracking or novelty seeking here, as they 
are not the focus of this manuscript.
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after 20 min, t(68) = 0.05, p = .961; see Table 3 for means 
and SDs. Average DBP was higher in the control condition 
than in the stress condition at baseline and after the first 30 s 
of the CPT (Baseline: t(68) = 4.46, p < .001; 30  s.: t(68) 
= 2.46, p = .017, see Table 3). In the stress condition DBP 
increased and was significantly higher than in the control 
condition after 3 min, t(68) = −5.32, p < .001. Afterwards 
DBP decreased again in the stress group and was similar to 
the control group after 8 min, t(68) = −0.61, p = .55, and 
lower after 20 min, t(68) = 2.07, p = .042. The analysis of 
α-amylase activity did not reveal a significant interaction 
between measurement time and condition, F(2.20,147.13) = 
2.28, p = .101, partial η2 = 0.03. Participants reported the 
water immersion task as much more unpleasant in the stress 
condition (M = 15.43, SD = 4.55) than in the control condi-
tion (M = 3.10, SD = 4.20), t(68) = 11.58, p < .001.
In sum, the stress manipulation successfully induced sub-
jective and physiological stress. In contrast, an analysis of 
T A B L E  2  Descriptive statistics (means and SDs) for measures of physiological and affective stress responses and risk taking by stress 
condition
Measure T1 T2 T3 T4
Stress condition
Risk premium 10.53 (5.59) 9.88 (5.85)
Physiological measures        
Cortisol (nmol/l) 10.69 (6.00) 9.02 (5.05) 17.57 (10.84) 19.08 (12.38)
α-amylase (units/ml) 29.56 (21.45) 38.14 (31.25) 35.24 (28.59) 40.77 (36.29)
Psychological measures        
Valence 2.85 (1.00) 3.08 (1.19) 2.95 (1.11) 3.03 (1.10)
Arousal 6.38 (1.29) 6.38 (1.63) 6.03 (1.95) 6.90 (1.28)
Dominance 5.95 (1.20) 5.85 (1.10) 6.13 (1.18) 6.23 (1.14)
State anger 1.12 (0.25) – 1.09 (0.19) –
State anxiety 1.83 (0.28) – 1.78 (0.31) –
Control condition
Risk premium 9.99 (6.91) 9.80 (7.86)
Physiological measures        
Cortisol (nmol/l) 10.96 (4.64) 9.10 (3.76) 7.77 (3.29) 7.05 (2.87)
α-amylase (units/ml) 27.72 (19.98) 41.69 (26.49) 28.95 (18.80) 33.39 (24.39)
Psychological measures        
Valence 3.17 (1.09) 3.03 (1.16) 3.07 (1.31) 2.93 (1.17)
Arousal 6.00 (1.55) 6.17 (1.70) 6.90 (1.60) 6.83 (1.88)
Dominance 6.10 (1.35) 6.27 (1.23) 6.43 (1.33) 6.53 (1.43)
State anger 1.10 (0.15) – 1.07 (0.12) –
State anxiety 1.72 (0.30) – 1.58 (0.27) –
Note: Nstress group = 40; Ncontrol group = 30 except for cortisol where Nstress group = 38 and Ncontrol group = 29 and for α-amylase where Ncontrol group = 29; higher numbers 
indicate more negative valence, less arousal, more dominance/control, more anger, and more anxiety.
T A B L E  3  Descriptive statistics for systolic and diastolic blood pressure (means and SDs) in the two conditions
Condition Baseline 30 s 3 min 8 min 20 min
Stress Condition          
SBP 120.43 (12.12) 120.58 (11.99) 134.53 (13.72) 127.39 (19.67) 118 (10.41)
DBP 69.55 (6.37) 70.93 (7.00) 88.57 (10.65) 74.91 (10.61) 70.48 (7.34)
Control Condition        
SBP 126.83 (11.88) 123.27 (13.45) 121.23 (12.12) 120.80 (12.46) 118.13 (12.10)
DBP 76.80 (7.20) 75.53 (8.68) 75.97 (8.56) 73.57 (6.68) 73.80 (5.57)
Note: Nstress = 40; Ncontrol = 30.
Abbreviations: DBP, diastolic blood pressure; SBP, Systolic blood pressure.
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affective valence showed that the stress manipulation did 
not have an effect on affective valence. As illustrated in 
Figure  2b, there was no interaction between measurement 
time and stress condition, F(3, 204) = 1.02, p = .385, par-
tial η2 = 0.02, nor main effects of time or stress condition 
(all ps > .65). Additional t tests revealed that the stress and 
the control groups did not differ in their affective valence 
at any of the measurement points (all ps < .21). There were 
also no main effect of stress condition and no interaction of 
stress condition and measurement time point for state anger 
or dominance (all ps > .27).
To assess the pattern of physiological stress responses and 
affect, we correlated measures of α-amylase activity, corti-
sol, and SBP and DBP reactivity with measures of subjective 
arousal and valence and their change from T2 to T3. Cortisol 
and α-amylase reactivity were measured as the area under 
the curve with respect to increase starting from T2 using the 
trapezoid formula (Pruessner, Kirschbaum, Meinlschmid, 
& Hellhammer, 2003), and SBP and DPB reactivity as the 
increase in SBP/DPB during the water immersion task (in-
crease between 30 s and 3 min after the start). SBP reactiv-
ity was significantly correlated with DBP reactivity, r(70) = 
.75, p < .001, change in reported arousal, r(70) = −.428, p = 
.020, cortisol reactivity, r(67) = .55, p < .001, and α-amylase 
activity, r(69) = .32, p = .010, but not with change in af-
fective valence or affective valence at T3. Cortisol reactivity 
correlated with DBP reactivity, r(67) = .53, p ≤ .001, and 
α-amylase activity, r(66) = .32, p = .009, but did not correlate 
significantly with change in arousal, r(67) = −.19, p = .117, 
affective valence at T3, r(67) = .01, p = .924, or change in 
affective valence, r(67) = .04, p = .780. Similarly, DBP reac-
tivity and α-amylase activity were correlated, r(69) = .39, p 
= .001, but did not correlate significantly with the subjective 
measures. Arousal at T3 was related to valence at T3, r(70) 
= −.43, p < .001.
3.2 | Risky decision making
We used multiple-price lists to access people's risk preferences 
(e.g., Pedroni et al., 2017). The gambles were constructed so 
that the target gambles were more risky (i.e., had a higher vari-
ance) than the reference gamble, in which people could gain 15 
or lose 5 with a probability of .5. Within each of the six sets the 
EV of the first target gamble was lower than the EV of the 
reference gamble (i.e., −5 compared to the EV of 5 for the 
reference gamble) and then increased in steps of 5, making the 
target gamble more and more attractive in comparison to the 
reference gamble (see Table 1). We assessed a person's risk 
preference by calculating a risk premium that measured how 
much higher the EV of a target gamble needed to be than the 
EV of the reference gamble for that person to prefer the target 
gamble to the reference gamble. Specifically, we determined 
in each set the target gamble with the lowest EV that was pre-
ferred to the reference gamble, subtracted the EV of the refer-
ence gamble from its EV, and calculated the mean across the 
sets. For instance, a person who still preferred the reference 
gamble to the target gamble “gain 50, lose 30 with p = .5” with 
an EV of 10, but accepted the target gamble “gain 60, lose 30 
with p = .5” with an EV of 15 would have a risk premium of 5. 
Accordingly, positive risk premiums reveal risk aversion 
and negative scores indicate risk seekingness.4 On average 
 4If a person never chose the target gamble in a set the risk premium was set 
as the highest EV in the respective set. If a person always chose the target 
gamble in a set the risk premium score was set at −10, that is, lower than 
the lowest EV in the set. If people switched more than once in a set we 
determined the target gamble with the lowest EV that was preferred to the 
reference gamble and subtracted the EV of the reference value from its EV. 
Then we determined the target gamble with the highest EV that was 
rejected in favor of the reference gamble and took its EV. The risk 
premium was calculated as the mean of these two values. The conclusions 
do not change if other measures of risk taking are used, such as the 
proportion of target gamble choices.
F I G U R E  2  (a) Average cortisol 
levels (nmol/l) and (b) affective valence 
over the time course of the study for the 
control group and the stress group. T1–T4 
denote the four measurement time points. 
The vertical line indicates the stress 
manipulation taking place between T2 and 
T3. Error bars denote one standard error
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participants had a positive risk premium of M  =  10.30 
(SD = 6.15) in the first session and M = 9.85 (SD = 6.73) in the 
second session, indicating that participants were risk averse. 
To assess the reliability and internal consistency of the risk 
premium we correlated risk premiums measured for the high 
and low variance gambles. This revealed a good consistency of 
r  =  .79. A further analysis considering the frequency with 
which people were switching more than once in a set showed 
that in both, the control and the stress condition, people re-
sponded more consistently in the second session, that is, less 
frequently switched several times within a set.
To analyze whether the stress manipulation influenced 
participants' risk preferences we ran an ANOVA on the av-
erage risk premium with session (before/after the stress in-
duction) as the within-subject factor and stress condition as 
the between-subjects factor. We did not find a main effect of 
session, F(1,68) = 0.97, p = .328, or stress, F(1,68) = 0.04, 
p = .837, nor an interaction between them, F(1,68) = 0.29, 
p = .59 (for means and SDs see Table 2), suggesting no di-
rect effect of the stress manipulation on financial risk taking. 
These results did not change when controlling for base level 
systolic and DBP.
Because previous studies have shown that men and 
women react differently to stress (e.g., Lighthall, Mather, 
& Gorlick, 2009), we ran additional analyses to investi-
gate if gender influenced the effect of stress on risk taking. 
Although men had slightly lower risk premiums, we did 
not find a significant effect of gender on risk premiums 
(Mmen  =  8.11, SE  =  1.37, Mwomen  =  10.93, SE  =  0.90), 
F(1,66) = 2.99, p = .089, partial η2 = 0.04. Also, gender 
did not interact with stress or measurement time point (all 
ps > .42) and did not significantly influence cortisol re-
activity, α-amylase reactivity, SBP and DBP reactivity or 
measures of arousal and affect and thus was not considered 
in the subsequent analyses.
3.3 | Relating physiological and affective 
measures to risky decision making
Next, we investigated whether physiological stress responses 
and affective measures were related to risky decision mak-
ing. To examine the relation between affective measures and 
risky decision making we correlated measures of affect and 
arousal before the risky decision-making task with the risk 
premiums. Affective valence at T1 was negatively correlated 
with risk premiums in Session 1, r(70) = −.25, p = .034, 
but affective valence at T3 did not correlate with risk premi-
ums in Session 2, r(70) = −.13, p = .290, suggesting more 
negative affect was related to somewhat less risk averse deci-
sions in the first session, but not after the stress manipulation. 
Arousal did not correlate with risk premiums at either time 
point, ps > .38.
For cortisol, neither at T1 nor at T3 were cortisol lev-
els correlated with risk premiums before and after the 
stress manipulation (all ps > .50); nor was cortisol reac-
tivity related to risk premiums after the stress induction, 
r(67) = .09, p = .466, or change in risk premiums, r(67) = 
.12, p = .337. Risk premiums and change in risk premiums 
was also not significantly related to SBP, DBP or α-amylase 
reactivity. These results did not change when controlling 
for base levels of cortisol, α-amylase, and SBP and DBP, 
respectively.
3.4 | The joint influence of affective 
valence and physiological stress responses on 
risky decision making
Finally, we explored whether physiological and psychologi-
cal responses, specifically affective valence, interacted in 
their influence on risky decision making. In particular, we 
considered whether risk preferences depended on the joint 
influence of affective valence and physiological measures. 
For this analysis we focused on affective valence at T3, that 
is how positive or negative participants felt before complet-
ing the second risky decision-making task. We focused on 
affective valence because previous research has indicated 
that it is related to risky decision making and may interact 
with levels of arousal (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). We chose 
affective valence at T3 because it best reflects participants' 
positive and negative affect when making the decision under 
stress or no stress.5 An ANOVA predicting risk premiums 
with measurement time point (before and after the stress ma-
nipulation) as the within-subject factor and stress condition, 
affect valence after the stress induction, and their interaction 
as between-subject factors showed a significant three-way 
interaction between measurement time point, stress condi-
tion, and affect, F(1, 66) = 9.36, p = .003, partial η2 = 0.12. 
To confirm this result and to investigate it more closely, we 
conducted a moderated regression with change in risk premi-
ums from Session 1 to Session 2 as the dependent variable, 
affect after the stress induction as the independent variable, 
and stress condition as the moderator variable using the SPSS 
macro by Hayes (2013), a tool to facilitate calculating a mod-
erated regression in SPSS, centering affect and stress and 
using SE-consistent estimators. As illustrated in Figure 3, the 
analysis confirmed the interaction between stress condition 
and affect, b = −2.08, SE = 0.74, in the direction that in the 
 5An alternative choice would be to use a measure of affective reactivity 
(i.e., a change in affect from T1 to T3 similar to the measures of 
physiological stress reactivity). We focus here on affective valence at T3, 
because most theories on affect and risky decision making consider the 
absolute level of affect to influence decision making and rarely consider 
change in affect.
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stress condition—but not in the control condition—negative 
affect predicted a decrease in risk premiums: That is, partici-
pants became more risk seeking in Session 2. Including the 
interaction increased the explained variance significantly 
compared to a model without interaction, ΔR2 = .12, F(1,66) 
= 7.93, p = .006. Separate tests of the influence of affect in 
the stress and the control condition indicated that in the stress 
condition more negative affect led to a significant decrease in 
risk premiums, b = −1.31, SE = 0.60, p = .034. In contrast, 
in the control condition the relation between negative affect 
and change in risk premiums was non-significant but pointed 
in the opposite direction: That is, more negative affect led to 
an increase in risk premiums, b = 0.77, SE = 0.42, p = .075. 
Further analyses controlling for baseline affect and risk pre-
miums in Session 1 led to the same conclusions. Similarly, 
controlling for diastolic and SBP at baseline, where we had 
found differences between the control and the stress group, 
did not change the pattern of results (interaction: p = .005; 
effect of affect valence in stress group: b = −1.41, SE = 0.69, 
p = .044).
To analyze whether the interaction between stress and 
affective valence was related to physiological stress re-
sponses, we ran additional analyses, in which we used 
physiological stress reactivity scores of all participants 
(i.e., cortisol, SPB, DPB, and α-amylase reactivity), as the 
respective moderator variable instead of stress condition. 
Only the analysis with cortisol reactivity indicated a simi-
lar moderation: Negative affect was related to a decrease in 
risk premiums in participants with high cortisol reactivity, 
ΔR2 = .07, F(1,63) = 5.17, p = .026; 1 SD over the mean 
cortisol reactivity, b = −1.37, SE = 0.68, p = .048, but not 
in participants with average cortisol reactivity or a decrease 
in cortisol levels. The analyses for DPB and α-amylase ac-
tivity indicated a similar pattern, but the effects were not 
statistically significant.
4 |  DISCUSSION
Research on the effects of stress on risk taking has produced 
a mixed set of results. In the current research we investigated 
whether considering the interplay of physiological and psy-
chological stress responses could contribute to understanding 
when stress will increase risky financial decision making. To 
this end, we measured participants' physiological and psy-
chological reactions to an acute stressor as well as their risk 
preferences.
The stress manipulation led to increased cardiovascular 
and cortisol reactivity as well as self-reported arousal but did 
not influence self-reported affective valence. The different 
physiological stress measures were moderately correlated but 
unrelated to affective valence. These results suggest that the 
manipulation of acute stress was successful, but show that 
not all stress induction methods exert a longer lasting effect 
on affective valence. They resonate with research, suggesting 
that the TSST induces longer lasting negative affect, whereas 
the CPT and SECPT do not (Giles et al., 2014; McRae et al., 
2006).
On average, the stress manipulation did not influence 
risk preferences. Also, none of the physiological stress 
responses, that is, cortisol, α-amylase, and SBP reactiv-
ity, showed a direct and independent influence on risky 
decisions, as suggested by the non-significant zero-order 
correlations between all measures and risk premiums. 
However, our results suggest that to understand how stress 
influences decision making it is necessary to consider the 
interplay of affect and physiological stress responses: After 
the stress manipulation, participants who reported high lev-
els of negative affect became more risk seeking in the stress 
condition, whereas in the control group negative affect was 
not related to risky decision making—if anything, people 
in a negative affective state became less risk seeking in 
the second session. The same interaction effect was found 
when comparing participants with high and low cortisol 
reactivity. In participants who showed high increases in 
cortisol, negative affect was related to an increase in risky 
decision making in the second decision-making session, 
F I G U R E  3  Scatterplot with regression lines depicting the 
estimated relation between the change in risk premiums between the 
first (S1) and the second (S2) session and affect measured before 
S2 in the control condition (white circles, dotted line) and the stress 
condition (grey circles, black line). Higher scores in change in risk 
premiums indicate an increase in risk aversion from S1 to S2. Higher 
scores on affect indicate more negative affect
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but not in participants with no increase in cortisol. In the 
following we first review how our results relate to previous 
studies on stress and risky decision making discussing the 
role of stressor type and gender and then outline why affect 
and stress responses may interact. Finally, we consider the 
limitations of our study.
4.1 | Effects of the stress manipulation on 
risky decision making
The meta-analysis by Starcke and Brand (2016) reviewing 
the literature up to that point found a reliable effect of stress 
inductions on risky decision making with processive stress-
ors such as the TSST, but no effect of systemic stressors such 
as the CPT. Similarly, another recent study by Sokol-Hessner 
et al. (2016) did also not find an effect of CPT (without so-
cial evaluative elements) on risk taking. However, we did not 
find an effect of our stress manipulation on participants' risky 
decision making, even though we used a stress manipulation 
that contained social evaluative (i.e., processive) elements. 
There are several potential explanations for this. For one, 
we used only an adaptation of the SECPT with a reduced 
social evaluative element compared to the original version 
(Schwabe et al., 2008). Physiological stress responses are 
less pronounced in the CPT compared to the SECPT and 
the TSST (e.g., McRae et al., 2006; Nowacki et al., 2019; 
Schwabe et al., 2008). Thus, even though we found a reli-
able effect on cortisol and blood pressure, it is possibly the 
stress responses were not strong enough to elicit effects on 
risky decision making. Against this explanation speaks, how-
ever, that the meta-analysis by Starcke and Brand (2016) did 
not show a relation between cortisol levels and risk taking, 
suggesting that the strength of the stress response does not 
suffice to explain whether an effect on risk taking is found 
or not. A second possibility is that we induced stress, but 
the social evaluative element in our stress induction was 
too weak to activate the respective neural pathways, given 
that we deviated from the original version by Schwabe et al. 
(2008). Dedovic et al. (2009) proposed that physical stress-
ors involve different biological mechanisms than psycho-
logical stressors. Specifically, they argued that psychological 
stressors influence activation in the orbitofrontal and medial 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) that are important for integrating per-
ceptual information as well as monitor and control emotional 
states. The orbitofrontal PFC is also involved in risky deci-
sion making (Mohr, Biele, Krugel, Li, & Heekeren, 2010; 
O’Neill & Schultz, 2013) providing a potential pathway how 
psychological stressors impact risk taking (see also Porcelli 
& Delgado, 2017; Porcelli, Lewis, & Delgado, 2012). Given 
that the orbitofrontal PFC also plays an important role in af-
fect, this links to the third possibility, that we did not find an 
overall effect of the stress manipulation, because the stress 
manipulation did not induce negative affect. In our task risk 
taking increased under stress, but only for participants who 
also reported being in a negative affective state. This could 
be related to the relatively weak social evaluative compo-
nent of our stress manipulation. However, given that also the 
SECPT does not seem to induce a longer lasting effect on 
mood (Giles et al., 2014) it is also possible that it is not nec-
essary that negative affect is induced by the stressor. Instead, 
it could be that whether more risk taking occurs under stress 
depends on the level of negative affect experienced by a per-
son. Accordingly, also systemic stressors could increase risk 
taking when participants are in a negative mood. We will dis-
cuss why negative affect may interact with stress to induce 
risk taking below. To disentangle these possibilities, further 
research using processive and systemic stressors as well as 
measuring affect at the time of the risk-taking task, which is 
often not the case in studies focusing on physiological stress 
responses, will be necessary.
A further potential explanation for our null results is that 
the effect of stress may depend on gender. In our study, we 
did not find significant gender differences. However, this 
could have been caused by a lack of power due to the rela-
tively small number of men in our study. A growing number 
of studies have reported that the impact of stress may dif-
fer for men and women (Cahlíková & Cingl, 2017; Kluen, 
Agorastos, Wiedemann, & Schwabe, 2017; Lighthall et al., 
2009; Nowacki et al., 2019; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 
2009). These studies suggest that the effect of stress on risk 
taking in men and women may depend on the stressor. In this 
vein, Nowacki et al. (2019) found an interaction between the 
type of the stressor (SECPT and CPT) and gender. Whereas 
women made more risky decisions after the SECPT, risk 
taking increased for men after the CPT. Similarly, Lighthall 
et al. (2009) found increased risk taking in men after the 
CPT, Kluen et al. (2017) found that giving hydrocortisone 
increased risk taking in men but not in women and Cahlíková 
and Cingl (2017) reported that men became more risk averse 
after the TSST. Yet, it should be noted that the meta-analysis 
by Starcke and Brand (2016) did not find an effect of gender 
on risk taking for processive or systemic stressors and also 
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2016) did not find an effect on risk tak-
ing in men with the CPT. This suggests that future research is 
necessary to investigate the origin of gender effects of stress 
on risk taking.
4.2 | Affect, stress, and risky 
decision making
In the moderation analyses we found an interaction between 
the stress condition and whether negative affect was related 
to more or less risk taking. Why would stress increase risk 
taking when participants also were experiencing negative 
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affect, but negative affect without stress reduce risk tak-
ing? The idea that negative affect sometimes increases and 
sometimes decreases risky decision making corresponds to 
the heterogeneity reported in the literature. Many studies 
reported that negative affective states, in particular fear 
but also sadness, reduce risk taking—arguably because 
negative affective states lead to a more negative view of 
the world, which could lead to an increased risk percep-
tion (Kamstra et al., 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Stanton 
et al., 2014; Yuen & Lee, 2003). Yet other studies found the 
opposite effect, that is, negative affective states increased 
risk taking (Kliger & Levy, 2003; Mittal & Ross, 1998; 
Tice et al., 2001) arguably because people are using risky 
decisions to improve or repair their mood (Isen & Labroo, 
2003). To integrate these two contradicting approaches, it 
has been proposed that whether negative affect increases 
or decreases risk taking depends on the degree to which 
the decision maker perceives that risk taking can be used to 
regulate affect (Cohen et al., 2007). For instance, Lee and 
Andrade (2015) found that the same fear manipulation was 
related to risk averse behavior in a stock investment task, 
but let to more risk seeking when the same task was framed 
as an exciting casino game. Acute stress may influence 
whether risk taking is perceived as a suitable regulatory 
strategy: For one, acute stress and stress-related increases 
in cortisol have been argued to increase the salience of 
rewards (Starcke & Brand, 2016). Increased reward sali-
ence, in turn, should make a high-risk option (that includes 
large rewards) more promising as a means for regulating 
affect. Second, stress and increases in cortisol arguably 
impair self-control (Maier, Makwana, & Hare, 2015). For 
instance, research showed that stress increases immediate 
gratification in monetary choices (Fields, Lange, Ramos, 
Thamotharan, & Rassu, 2014; Lu et al., 2014) and when se-
lecting unhealthy but tasty foods (Epel, Lapidus, McEwen, 
& Brownell, 2001; Newman, O’Connor, & Conner, 2007).
Accordingly, people in a negative affective state with-
out stress may focus on the negative consequences related 
to choosing high-risk options, inhibiting risk taking. In con-
trast, people in a negative affective state and under stress may 
see high-risk options as an opportunity to regulate affect, 
because physiological stress responses such as the release 
of cortisol increase the salience of the rewards and impair 
self-control processes that would otherwise inhibit choosing 
options with high potential losses. The results also resonate 
with a study finding an increase in risk taking relatively 
shortly after a stressor but not after a longer period of time 
(Bendahan et al., 2017). An explanation is that negative af-
fective reactions are most pronounced during or right after 
a stressor has been experienced but then return to baseline, 
whereas physiological responses such as an increase in cor-
tisol last longer (but see Pabst, Brand, & Wolf, 2013b for a 
different pattern of results).
On a biological level, it has been argued that affective 
states can modulate decision making via multiple neu-
ral pathways involving areas that are important for reward 
sensitivity such as the orbitofrontal cortex and the insula 
(Damasio et al., 2000; Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & 
Davidson, 1997, for a review see Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-
Hessner, 2014). Both these areas have also been connected 
to assessment of rewards and risk and are also affected by 
acute stress (Mather & Lighthall, 2012; Porcelli & Delgado, 
2017; Porcelli et al., 2012). Thus, the interplay of affect and 
stress could influence emotion regulation and the perception 
of rewards and ultimately risk taking.
4.3 | Limitations
An important limitation in our study is that we only measured 
affective valence and not specific emotions. Thus, it is unclear 
which negative emotional states were predominant in our sam-
ple. Indeed, the reported negative affect is likely to be a mix-
ture of feelings ranging from fearful to annoyed, displeased 
to frustrated and sad depending on participants preexisting 
affective states as well as their task experience. But, different 
negative emotional states such as anger, sadness, and fear can 
differ in their influence on decision-making processes (Frey, 
Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 2014; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner, 
Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Frequently, it is argued that anger increases risk taking, while 
fear decreases it (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The effects of sad-
ness are more inconsistent. Raghunathan and Pham (1999) ar-
gued that sadness should increase risk taking but other studies 
have found that depressive symptoms (Kamstra et al., 2003) 
and sad events (Lepori, 2015) decreased risk taking. Thus, the 
effect of sadness may depend on the interpretation of the situa-
tion and the potential for mood regulation (Cohen et al., 2007) 
and the interpretation of the task (see also Lee & Andrade, 
2015 for differential effects of fear). Thus, further research 
teasing apart how specific emotional states interact with phys-
iological measures of stress is necessary.
Second, cortisol responses to stress have been shown to 
depend on the female ovulatory cycle and the use of con-
traceptives (e.g., Kirschbaum, Kudielka, Gaab, Schommer, 
& Hellhammer, 1999), which we did not control for in this 
study. We also did not measure participants body mass index 
(BMI). This introduces variability in the effect of the stress 
induction on cortisol levels, which could potentially have con-
tributed to the null effect of cortisol reactivity on risk prefer-
ences. Third, our study is an exploratory analysis and focuses 
on a single type of stress induction, raising the question of 
whether the results can be generalized to other stressors. In 
particular, as we used an adapted version of the SECPT, it 
would be good to replicate our results following the protocol 
of the SECPT more closely as well as use other stressors such 
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as the TSST or the CPT. Finally, recent research reported that 
a cognitive load manipulation leads to more unsystematic 
risk taking (Olschewski, Rieskamp, & Scheibehenne, 2018). 
In a similar vein, stress could lead to more errors in decision 
making. Although we did not find evidence for increased in-
consistent choices in the risky decision task we used, it is 
possible that acute stress could also lead to more mistakes in 
decision making, in particular when stressors reduce cogni-
tive resources.
5 |  CONCLUSIONS
In sum, our study provides a first step toward understanding 
the complex relation between physiological and psychological 
components in the influence of stress on risky decision making. 
It offers evidence that stress-related physiological changes such 
as increases in cortisol and affective states interact in shaping 
risky decision making. Only when people were stressed and 
in a negative affective state did stress lead to increases in risk 
taking. These results show that when aiming to understand the 
influence of stress on risky decision making, it is necessary to 
consider not only single measures of stress responses but also 
the complex interplay of different response types.
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